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Abstract—With the ever-increasing popularity of resource-
intensive mobile applications, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC),
e.g., offloading computationally expensive tasks to the cellular
edge, has become a prominent technology for the next generation
wireless networks. Despite its great performance in terms of
delay and energy, MEC suffers from restricted power allowance
and computational capability of the edge nodes. Therefore, it is
imperative to develop distributed mechanisms for computation
offloading, so that not only the computational servers are utilized
at their best capacity, but also the users’ latency constraints are
fulfilled. In this paper, by using the theory of Minority Games,
we develop a novel distributed server activation mechanism for
computational offloading. Our scheme guarantees energy-efficient
activation of servers as well as satisfaction of users’ quality-of-
experience (QoE) requirements in terms of latency.
Keywords: Computation offloading, mobile edge computing,
server mode selection, minority game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the ever-increasing popularity of computationally
intensive applications, computation offloading capability has
become a prerequisite for next generation wireless networks.
Since the energy, storage, and computing capacity of small
mobile devices are limited, mobile users need to transfer com-
putationally expensive tasks to powerful computing servers.
Despite its higher computational capability, remote cloud may
not be the ideal option, as the long distance between the
cloud and the user device yields substantial latency and energy
cost. In contrast, small scale computing servers located in
the network edge might provide services at reduced latency
and energy cost, compared to the remote cloud. This is
referred to as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) [1]. However,
efficient utilization of MEC servers is vital, since they have
limited computational resources and power. To this end, one
solution is to activate only a specific number of servers, while
keeping the rest in the energy saving mode. At the same time,
users’ latency requirements should be taken into account, as
overloading the servers with computational tasks can result
in unacceptable delay. Therefore, addressing this trade-off
is a major issue in developing efficient MEC systems. This
becomes challenging in the presence of uncertainty in task
arrival and/or in the absence of any central controller. Other
challenges include minimizing users’ energy consumption and
efficient radio resource management.
In [1], the authors develop a distributed algorithm in a game
theoretic framework to address the decision making problem
for computation offloading by the users, so that the MEC cloud
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and radio resources are efficiently utilized. In [2], the authors
investigate a computational offloading problem, where mobile
users offload to a variety of edge nodes such as small base
stations, macro base stations and access points, in order to
utilize their computational resources. Reference [3] provides
centralized resource allocation algorithms that minimize the
weighted sum energy consumption under delay constraints
for both TDMA and OFDMA protocols in a mobile edge
computation offloading system. A multi-objective offloading
problem is formulated and analyzed using queuing theory
in [4]. A comprehensive survey on the state-of-the-art of
computation offloading in mobile edge networks can be found
in [5].
The majority of the existing literature focus on user-
centric objectives such as meeting users’ delay constraints
and minimizing users’ energy consumption. On the contrary,
our work presents a hybrid view where both servers’ and
users’ standpoints are considered. In doing so, we address the
uncertainty caused by the randomness in channel quality and
users’ requests. We first analyze the statistical characteristics
of the offloading delay. Based on this, we model the compu-
tational offloading problem as a planned market, where the
price of computational services is determined by an authority.
Afterward, by using the theory of minority games [6], we
develop a novel approach for efficient mode selection (or
activation) at the servers’ side. The designed mode selection
mechanism guarantees a minimal server activation to ensure
energy efficiency, while meeting the users’ delay constraints.
Moreover, this scheme is distributed, and does not require
any prior information at the servers’ side. We numerically
investigate the performance of the proposed method.
In Section II, we present the system model and formulate
the server activation problem. In Section III, we cast the
servers’ mode selection problem as a minority game theoretic
framework, and provide an algorithmic solution. Numerical
results and discussions are presented in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider an MEC system consisting of a virtual pool of
M computational servers (e.g., small base stations), denoted
by a setM, and a set of users (e.g., mobile devices). Each user
has some delay sensitive computational tasks to be completed
in consecutive offloading periods. Each offloading period is
referred to as one time slot. In every time slot t, the users
offload a total number of KT computational jobs to the
pool. Prior to task arrival, every server independently decides
whether to
• accept computation jobs (active mode); or
• not to accept any computation job (inactive mode).
To become active, each server incurs a fixed energy cost
represented by ef (dimensionless value). In addition, doing
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2each task yields an extra ej units of energy cost. By processing
each job, a server receives a reimbursement (benefit) equal to
ep > ej. Let c(t) be the number of servers that decide to
become active at time slot t. The total KT jobs are equally
divided among the active servers, so that the number of jobs
per active server is given by
k(t) = KT/c(t). (1)
Hence, each active server processes k(t) jobs, and thus earns
a total reward given by
R(t) = k(t)(ep − ej)− ef. (2)
For each server, being in active mode is attractive only if a
minimum desired reward, denoted by Rth > 0 can be obtained.
Then each active server has to receive at least
kmin =
Rth + ef
ep − ej (3)
jobs to achieve the minimum desired reward. Each computa-
tional job requires a random time to be processed by a server,
denoted by tc. We assume that tc lies within the interval (0, T )
and has a truncated normal distribution with parameters µ
and σ. Moreover, considering Rayleigh fading, the channel
gain (h) is exponentially distributed with parameter ν. We
model the round trip transmission delay (from the user to the
servers pool) as a linear function of the channel gain. The
channel gains in both directions are assumed to be equal. Thus
formally,1
t0 = 2(ah+ b), (4)
where a < 0 and b > 0 are constants. The total offloading
delay θ is the sum of processing delay at the server, tc and
the round trip transmission delay t0. Thus,
θ = tc + t0. (5)
The following proposition characterizes θ statistically.2
Proposition 1. The expected value and variance of θ are given
by
µθ = µ+ σ
φ(−µσ )− φ(T−µσ )
Φ(T−µσ )− Φ(−µσ )
+
2(a+ bν)
ν
, (6)
and
σ2θ = σ
2
(
1 +
( −µ
σ φ(
−µ
σ )− T−µσ φ(T−µσ )
Φ(T−µσ )− Φ(−µσ )
)
−
(
φ(−µσ )− φ(T−µσ )
Φ(T−µσ )− Φ(−µσ )
)2)
+
4a2
ν2
, (7)
respectively, where Ω = 1
σ(Φ(T−µσ )−Φ(−µσ ))
. Moreover, Φ() =
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
√
2
))
is the cumulative distribution function of a
standard normal distribution.
1Assuming a normal distribution for the time required to perform each task
does not limit the applicability, and similar analysis can be performed with
any other distribution. The same holds for the linear model of the transmission
delay. Any other model can be used at the expense of additional calculus steps.
Also, note that since the required energy to perform each task is proportional
to the required time to perform that task, one might consider ej ∝ κµ with
κ > 0.
2The proof follows by simple probability rules given the independence of
tc and t0. We omit the proof due to space limitation.
Every user requires its offloaded job(s) be completed by a
deadline T . Therefore, in every round t and for every server,
the total processing time of all tasks, i.e.,
τ =
k(t)∑
i=1
θi, (8)
should be less than T , so that the delay experienced by the
last user in the queue does not exceed the deadline T as well.
In other words, the condition τ ≤ T ensures that all users
receive their jobs completed before the deadline. Since θi are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), τ is the sum of
k(t) i.i.d. random variables. Therefore, the expected value and
variance of τ are given by k(t)µθ and k(t)σ2θ , respectively. For
large enough k(t) (e.g., k(t) ≥ 30), and by using the central
limit theorem, the distribution of τ can be approximated as
τ ∼ Nor(k(t)µθ, k(t)σ2θ). (9)
Due to the uncertainty caused by the randomness, determin-
istic performance guarantee in terms of delay is not feasible.
Thus we resort to a probabilistic guarantee of users’ QoE
requirement. Formally, let Pr[τ > T ] be the probability that
τ exceeds T , i.e., the likelihood that the delay requirement
of some offloading user(s) is not satisfied. We require that
Pr[τ > T ] remains below a predefined threshold β. That is,
Pr[τ > T ] ≤ β. (10)
Considering both the servers’ and users’ perspectives, the
trade-off in the system can be seen as follows: On one hand,
for each server it is beneficial to be active only if the number
of active servers is less than a certain threshold cmax, so
that every active server receives the minimum number of
jobs required to achieve the threshold reward (as stated by
(3)). On the other hand, the users prefer that the number of
jobs per server k(t) is small enough so that their desired
QoE is fulfilled with high probability, i.e., the number of
active servers shall be larger than a certain threshold cmin.
In what follows, we will derive the values of cmin and cmax
analytically. Therefore, for the offloading system to perform
efficiently, the number of active servers at any offloading round
t, i.e., c(t) should be determined in way that both servers and
users are satisfied. We denote this value by cth.
A. Condition for Servers
Recalling (3), to achieve minimum desired reward Rth, each
active server has to receive at least kmin jobs. Consequently,
at most
cmax = KT/kmin (11)
servers can be in the active mode so that every active server
receives the threshold reward Rth, while inactive servers re-
ceive no reward. Thus, the condition below should be satisfied
when selecting the cut-off cth:
Condition I: cth ≤ cmax. (12)
B. Condition for Users
Recall that the users’ QoE requirement given by (10). Then,
from (9) and (10), we have
1− Φ
(
T − k(t)µθ√
k(t)σθ
)
≤ β, (13)
3which, by definition, is equivalent to
erf
(
T − k(t)µθ√
2k(t)σθ
)
≥ 1− 2β. (14)
Since erf(x) is an increasing function, erf−1(x) is also an
increasing function. Therefore, (14) results in
k(t)µθ +
√
2k(t)σθerf−1(1− 2β)− T ≤ 0. (15)
Solving the quadratic inequality, we obtain;
−√2σθerf−1(1− 2β)−
√
∆
2µθ
≤
√
k(t) ≤
−√2σθerf−1(1− 2β) +
√
∆
2µθ
(16)
where ∆ = 2σ2θ
(
erf−1(1− 2β))2 + 4µθT . Since k(t) ≥ 0,
considering only the right hand side of the inequality (16), we
have
k(t) ≤
(
−√2σθerf−1(1− 2β) +
√
∆
2µθ
)2
. (17)
Therefore,
kmax =
(
−√2σθerf−1(1− 2β) +
√
∆
2µθ
)2
(18)
is the maximum allowable number of tasks per active server
so that the users’ QoE (i.e., latency) requirement is satisfied
with probability 1− β. Thus by (1), the minimum number of
active servers cmin to guarantee the users’ QoE satisfaction is
cmin =
KT
kmax
. (19)
Therefore, the condition below should be satisfied when se-
lecting the threshold cth.
Condition II: cth ≥ cmin. (20)
By conditions (12) and (20), the optimal number of active
servers, cth, is determined by solving the following equation:
cmin = cmax. (21)
Or equivalently, the system performs optimally in terms of
servers’ energy and users’ delay when cth servers are active
so that
kmin = kmax. (22)
Thus, we obtain the threshold cth using (11), (19), and (22) as
cth =
KT
kmax
. (23)
To ensure that the entire system works efficiently, in addition
to the optimal number of active servers (cth), the price of
receiving computing services (i.e., ep) must be determined
by an authority (for instance, macro base station or network
planner). By using (3), we have
ep =
Rth + ef
kmax
+ ej, (24)
with kmax given by (18). In fact, in a distributed system, if a
price larger than (24) is charged, more servers than cth would
become active, since every server achieves Rth with lower
number of tasks than kmin. In contrast, for ep lower than (24),
achieving Rth requires more tasks per server than kmax, so
that users’ QoE might not be satisfied.
Now the challenge is to activate cth servers in a self-
organized manner, which is addressed in the following section.
III. MODELING THE PROBLEM AS A MINORITY GAME
A Minority game (MG) can model the interaction among
a large number of players competing for limited shared
resources. In a basic MG, the players select between two
alternatives and the players belonging to the minority group
win. The minority is typically defined using some cut-off
value. The collective sum of the selected actions by all players
is referred to as the attendance. The advantages of MG include
simple implementation, low overhead, and scalability to large
set of players, which are of vital importance in a dense wireless
network. Details can be found in [6], [7].
We model the formulated server mode selection problem
as an MG, where the M servers represent the players, with
a cut-off value cth for the number of active servers. In each
offloading period, the servers decide between the two actions,
i.e., being active or inactive, denoted by 1 and 0, respectively.
We denote the action of a given player i in the time slot
t by ai(t). The number of active servers c(t) maps to the
attendance. Each player has S strategies. According to our
formulated servers’ mode selection problem and the analysis
in Section II,
• If c(t) ≤ cth, each of the c(t) active servers (the minority)
earns a reward higher than or equal to the minimum
desired reward, Rth.
• If c(t) > cth, c(t) active servers cannot achieve Rth. In
this case inactivity (i.e., the action of the minority) is
considered as the winning choice, since inactive servers
spend no cost without being properly reimbursed.
A. Control Information
After each round of play, a central unit (e.g., a macro base
station) broadcasts the winning choice to all servers by sending
a one-bit control information:
w(t) =
{
1, if c(t) ≤ cth
0, otherwise.
(25)
Note that neither the actual attendance value c(t) nor the
system cut-off cth is known by the players.
B. Utility
Let Ui,a(t) and Ui,p(t) denote the utility that server i
receives for being active and being inactive, respectively.
Based on the discussion above, we define
Ui,a(t) =
{
1, if c(t) ≤ cth
0, otherwise
(26)
and
Ui,p(t) =
{
1, if c(t) > cth
0, otherwise.
(27)
4C. Distributed Learning Algorithm
Every player applies a basic strategy reinforcement tech-
nique to solve the formulated MG, summarized in Algorithm
1 for some player i. Details can be found in [6].
Algorithm 1 Distributed learning algorithm to solve server
mode selection MG [6]
1: Initialization: Randomly draw S strategies from the uni-
versal strategy pool, gathered in a set S. Moreover, For
every s ∈ S, set the score Vi,s(0) = 0.
2: for t = 1, 2, ... do
3: If t = 1, select the current strategy, si(1), uniformly
at random from the set S. Otherwise, select the best
strategy so far, defined as
si(t) = argmax
s∈S
Vi,s(t). (28)
4: Select the action ai(t), predicted by si(t) as the winning
choice.
5: The central unit broadcasts the control information
(winning choice), w(t).
6: Update the score of the strategy si(t) as
Vi,s(t+ 1) =
{
Vi,s(t) + 1, if ai(t) = w(t)
Vi,s(t), otherwise
(29)
7: end for
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
For numerical analysis, we choose M = 21, KT = 500,
Rth = 100, ej = 5, ef = 50, β = 0.05, T = 0.35, µ = 7,
σ2 = 2, ν = 1, a = −1 and b = 2.5. Simulation is carried out
for 32 runs and in each run, the servers randomly draw a set of
strategies (S = 2) and repeatedly execute the MG for 10000
offloading periods. For the given parameters’ value, using (23),
the cut-off yields cth = 15. The optimal (central activation) and
random choice game (each server selects its action uniformly
at random) are also simulated for comparison.
In Fig. 1, we present the variation of important system
parameters as a function of users’ QoE index β (see Section
II). From the figure, the following can be concluded: As β
increases, the number of required active servers (cth) decreases,
thereby allowing a larger number of offloading tasks to be pro-
cessed per server. Similarly, the maximum allowable number
of tasks per active server (kmax) increases with increasing β.
In fact, with larger β, larger delay (T ) is tolerable, or in other
words, longer task queue (kmax) is allowed. Naturally, in this
case, the price per task, ep, reduces, as intuitively expected for
a weaker service.
Fig. 2 shows the changes in users’ probability measure, i.e.,
Pr[τ > T ]. The users meet their QoE certainty requirement
whenever c(t) > cth. As the attendance fluctuates near cth, the
probability value also remains near the desired certainty. The
average utility per user is depicted in Fig. 3. It can be seen that
the utility of MG-based strategy is higher than that of random
selection. Yet, it is below the average utility of the optimal
scenario. This is due to the fact that in MG-based method,
servers make decisions under minimal external information,
and without any coordination with other servers.
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Fig. 1. Variation of cth, kmax, and ep as a function of β.
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